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The East-South Axis: Legitimizing 
the “Hungarian Solution to Migration”
Annastiina Kallius1
Introduction: The Ill-fated Lorry
On a hot summer evening in June 2013, I joined a farewell gathering at the 
Keleti railway station in Budapest, the nodal point of international train traffic 
in Hungary. I had come to say goodbye to a group of seventy Afghans, all 
granted international protection by the Hungarian state after crossing through 
the Balkans. After half a year’s protesting against the prospect of homelessness, 
the group decided to take matters into their own hands and travel to Germany 
together in order to re-apply for asylum. The scene was impressive, as the 
group occupied a whole wagon in the daily train between Budapest and Munich. 
Although migration was not much of a topic in the local media at the time, 
Hungarian alternative press recorded the event, criticizing structural homeless-
ness among recognized refugees, with an evocative article titled “Hungary: even 
refugees escape from here” (Horváth, 2013). The number of asylum seekers in 
Hungary was exponentially increasing in 2013: tent camps had been set up, and 
arbitrary detention of asylum seekers as a deterrent was about to be introduced 
again (UNHCR, 2013; Nagy, 2016a).2 International media concentrated its focus 
on tragic events unfolding in the Mediterranean, where the number of people 
crossing the sea, and drowning in it, was rising. Meanwhile, the Balkan route 
was steadily solidifying as another principal route to the EU, although escaping 
the gaze of policy-makers. This group of seventy Afghans, whose political protest 
and class action later became iconic in the emerging movement for the rights of 
refugees and migrants in Hungary, faced no problems when they embarked on 
1 PhD Candidate, Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Helsinki, Faculty of 
Social Sciences, Unioninkatu 37 (PL 54), 00014 Helsingin yliopisto, Finland; 
annastiina.kallius@helsinki.fi 
I would like to thank Prem Kumar Rajaram, Ana Chiritoiu, Serge Weber, and one 
anonymous reviewer for their thoughts and nuanced feedback on this article. I would 
further like to extend my gratitude for Boldizsár Nagy for sharing with me his insightful 
analysis of the recent changes in the Hungarian asylum policy.
2 Until 2012, the number of asylum applications in Hungary remained more or less 
steady, ca. 2,000 applications per year. In 2013, the annual increase was 844% (18,900 
applications). In 2014, the number of applications more than doubled into 42,777. The 
absolute majority of the 177,135 people who applied for asylum in Hungary in 2015 left 
the country before the end of the procedure. For these numbers, and a further analysis 
of the legal developments of the Hungarian asylum system see Nagy (2016a), and the 
monthly updates of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee.
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their journey. They arrived safely in Germany, where, at the time of writing, some 
of them are still undergoing the complicated process of re-determining their 
refugee status, while others have already been granted international protection 
by the German state.
Two years later I was at same location, nearly at the same time. Also on a 
steaming hot summer day, many of the same people who had waved goodbye 
to the Afghan group in 2013, once again congregated at Keleti to mark a journey 
to the west  – or more accurately, to commemorate it, since this journey had 
met a fatal end. A day earlier, on August 27th, an abandoned lorry had been 
found in Burgenland in Austria near the Hungarian border. Inside the lorry, the 
police discovered the dead bodies of seventy-one people: asylum seekers from 
multiple countries, mainly Afghanistan and Syria. Stuffed inside the truck that 
could have only taken on safely half of their number, they had suffocated to 
death one week earlier.
The tragic incident took place after more than one month’s deadlock at the 
Keleti station, which had developed into an ad hoc refugee camp and where an 
estimated 1,500 people were sleeping every day. Just like their predecessors 
in 2013, the people in the ill-fated lorry of summer 2015, had in all likelihood, 
walked up to the international ticket counter at Keleti, and bought train tickets to 
Vienna or Munich. When approaching the platforms, however, migrant-looking 
people were stopped and denied entry by the police. In all likelihood, this is 
also what happened to the fifty-nine men, eight women and four children who, 
not having succeeded in taking the train, had then embarked on their journey 
towards the west in the back of a truck.
The similarities and contrasts between these two journeys are striking, and 
they beg the question: what happened? In this article, my aim is to answer this 
question and relate it to the wider European context. I argue that the answer 
lies in the implementation of the so-called “Hungarian solution to migration”.3 
In short, this refers to a three-fold policy package: (1) selective closure of the 
Hungarian borders, blocking the entrance of migrants but allowing them to 
move on; (2) a series of deterrents including detention, poor reception condi-
tions, and no integration support, and (3) promotion of a pervasive government-
sanctioned propaganda campaign advancing a particular idea of Europe.4
After providing a brief contextualization of the Balkan route, I outline the 
evolution and anatomy of the Hungarian solution in greater detail. First, I 
address the domestic anchoring of the policy, related to a governmental attempt 
to consolidate a hegemonic discourse of heteronormative conservative-nation-
alist citizenship that produces surplus populations (Anderson, 2013; Rajaram, 
2015; Fekete, 2016; Cervinkova, 2016). I then continue to the specific focus of 
3 The term “Hungarian solution” was coined by the Hungarian government in its 
parlance in 2016. I thank Prem Kumar Rajaram for his insightful and inspiring comments 
during our discussions on the concept and content of the Hungarian solution. For an 
earlier analysis, see Rajaram, 2016.
4 Since gaining two-thirds majority in 2010, the conservative-nationalist Fidesz govern-
ment has fundamentally transformed numerous institutions in Hungary. Gagyi (2016) has 




this article, the propaganda-aspects of the solution and how they relate to 
developments in the East and West of Europe. Gille’s (2017) “relational perspec-
tive” for analyzing Eastern European responses to migration is utilized. Such a 
perspective goes beyond contextualization, and uncovers connections between 
western and eastern European developments that are not necessarily causal 
(Gille, 2017). Tošić (2017) has also underlined the importance of relational and 
historical analysis of the Balkan route, and pointed to the resurfacing of east/
west connections in the Serbian context. Following these authors, I suggest that 
the governmental propaganda discourse in Hungary capitalizes precisely on 
such relational connections. In addition to the east/west divide, the discourse is 
also intertwined with the reproduction of a Europe/Balkans divide, another rela-
tional epistemology of Europe (Cabot, 2014; Green, 2005; Helms, 2008; Herzfeld, 
1989; Todorova, 1997). I argue that in its discourse of defending “Europe,” the 
Hungarian government strategically positions itself at the crux of these nesting 
orientalisms (Bakić-Hayden, 1995) and moral hierarchies at play, within East/
West and Europe/Balkans binaries. In other words, I claim that interwoven 
moral hierarchies and nesting orientalisms within the European space allows 
the Hungarian government to position itself as a defender of a particular type 
of Europe, and thus legitimize the Hungarian solution to migration. In this vein, 
my contribution builds on earlier scholarship that has exposed the coloniality 
and orientalism of power of the East-West-rhetoric (Chari and Verdery, 2009; 
Owczarzak, 2009; Böröcz, 2000; Buchowski, 2006), and is meant to contribute 
to the discussion of the dynamics between European peripheries in relation to 
migration and location. To clarify, I do not suggest that the Hungarian, or any 
other, government be devoid of responsibility. Instead, following Nancheva 
(2015) who has analyzed the failure of the Bulgarian asylum system, I argue 
that this responsibility needs to be examined in its wider, relational context, 
including but not limited to the transfer of EU border policy to Eastern Europe 
(Kallius, 2016; Lavenex, 1999 and 2002; Byrne et al., 2004, for insightful analysis 
on Bulgaria, see also Apostolova, 2016).
My inquiry focuses chiefly on the years 2015-17, although the crafting of 
the Hungarian solution began much earlier. Methodologically, this conceptual 
contribution relies on four years of anthropological research in the field of 
migration and asylum in Hungary. During these years I have also been involved 
in the emerging social movement for the rights of migrants in Hungary. In partic-
ular, the ethnographic vignettes and analysis of the evolution of the Hungarian 
solution to migration stem from this source. In setting down the parameters of 
the public discourse on migration, I take the Hungarian-language governmental 
media that advocates the Hungarian solution to migration to be an integral 
part of the ethnographic analysis. This media landscape is saturated by “soci-
etally targeted advertisements” (társadalmi célú reklámok) which aggressively 
highlight the dangers of migration in the form of TV advertisements, billboards, 
leaflets distributed to homes, print advertisements and the like.5 I also rely 
5 The governmental media is available in daily news programs in Russian, Chinese, 
English, German and Hungarian (http://www.hirado.hu/video/hirmusorok/), on the official 
news site of the government (www.kormany.hu/en), and the two government-ran blogs 
(http://hungarytoday.hu and http://abouthungary.hu). In response to the government 
control over media, several independent Hungarian-language online news portals that 
focus particularly on corruption and social policy have emerged in recent years.
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on some international media coverage on Hungary. Juxtaposing liberal inter-
national media with the Hungarian governmental media might, at first hand, 
seem unwarranted. Rather than presenting them as a binary, however, I opt for 
these because the propaganda element of the Hungarian solution to migration 
is fueled precisely in response to such modernist representations of Hungary in 
outlets such as the Guardian, Der Spiegel, and New York Times.6
The Recent History of the Balkan Route
Since 2015, international liberal media has incessantly criticized Eastern 
Europe, and particularly Hungary, for “its” treatment of migrants. This coincides 
with the “discovery” of the Balkan route by the international public. For years 
leading to 2015, however, the route has been a steady component of Europe’s 
“borderscape” (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2007), taken by people who made it 
to Greece, but wanted and were able to continue northwards to other countries. 
Those crossing the Turkish-Bulgarian border also join this route.7 Although 
people taking the Balkan route routinely shared accounts of violence in Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary, the relative anonymity of the route also guar-
anteed a relative stability of the route.8
As the number of people taking the route increased in 2015, its discovery by 
the international media and policymakers caused corollary effects throughout 
the route. Sabine Hess has showed how the naming and mapping of routes 
changes power dynamics, and furnishes so-called transit-countries with power 
to use their status as a bargaining chip to push through their own desired 
policies, at the same time as revealing the full force of migration (Hess, 2010). 
Indeed, as the Balkan route began to appear in the media and on policy-maps, 
events on the route escalated and the border policies of individual European 
Union member states oscillated throughout the route, culminating in the 
European Commission’s attempt to finally close the route.
A brief, non-exhaustive outline of developments of the Balkan route between 
2015 and 2017, locates Hungary in its constitutive context and illustrates the 
dynamics of states’ supposedly independent decisions that have corollary 
effects. During summer 2015, the majority of migrants who came to the EU via 
the Balkan route crossed the Aegean Sea instead of arriving via Bulgaria. Most 
were driven to cross the sea because the land borders are difficult to cross: the 
Greek-Turkish land border has been partly sealed off by a fence, and the notori-
6 For an example, see the blog post from Zoltán Kovács, the spokesperson of the 
Hungarian government, 14 March 2017: “Dear New York Times Editors: you just don’t get 
it, do you?” (http://abouthungary.hu/blog/dear-new-york-times-editors-you-just-dont-get-
it-do-you/, accessed 12/06/2017).
7 The implications of this initial choice are serious. According to the Dublin Regulation, 
people seeking asylum in the EU may be deported back to the first EU member state 
they entered. Between 2011 and 2017, Dublin deportations to Greece were stopped due 
to a European Court of Human Rights ruling, rendering Hungary the country that many 
migrants would have been returned to. People who cross through Bulgaria face possible 
Dublin deportation to Bulgaria.
8 For accounts of the violence over the last years, see bordermonitoring.eu. Local 
support structures in these locations have existed for years. For well-researched example 
of the Serbian context, see Stojic-Mitrovic and Meh (2015).
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ously dangerous Bulgarian-Turkish border is guarded partially by a fence and 
paramilitary vigilante groups. People who did not wish to stay in Greece and 
were able to move onwards, continued northward to Macedonia, and faced 
severe obstacles when attempting to cross the border. The impromptu refugee 
camp in Idomeni evolved into one of the most iconic symbols of border enforce-
ment and exclusion on one hand, and of the agency and autonomy of people on 
the move, on the other (Tošić, 2017). The tracks via Greece and Bulgaria conjoin 
in Serbia. Until 2015, the route continued smoothly northward to Hungary, where 
the government turned a blind eye to its position as the second EU-member 
state on the route. From Hungary, most people were, contrary to EU legisla-
tion, allowed to continue westwards, while others decided to or were forced to 
stay, due to personal reasons, financial resources and/or the Dublin regulation. 
Like Greece and Bulgaria, Hungary, could also be characterized as both a transit 
and as a destination country. It is a peripheral outlier for the Western European 
gaze, and both a central point of entry and potential return for a migrant seeking 
asylum in EU.
When the Hungarian borders with Serbia, and later with Croatia, were tempo-
rarily closed to migrants in late autumn 2015, the route shifted. From Serbia, 
people continued westward to Croatia instead of Hungary (Čapo, 2015), onwards 
to Austria via Slovenia, and ahead to Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. 
This passage collapsed as the North of Europe showcased its political power: in 
January 2016, Sweden introduced border checks with Denmark, citing infrastruc-
tural limitations (Dzenovska, 2017). In turn, Denmark announced border controls 
at the German border, which then continued southward like a domino. When 
Germany commenced border controls on the Austrian border, Austria introduced 
a maximum quota for asylum requests at the Slovenian border. Slovenia, in turn, 
built a fence on its border with Croatia, which controversially closed its border to 
migrants from Serbia (Tošić, 2017). In spring 2016, while EU was striking a deal 
with Turkey in an attempt to close the route, for those still in Serbia, Hungary 
re-emerged as a transit route, as the Hungarian-Serbian border fence was, at the 
time, relatively easy to climb over or crawl under. At the same time, the number 
of people arriving via the Aegean Sea radically decreased as a result of the 
EU-Turkey deal. The Hungarian border was nearly sealed in summer 2016 when 
pushbacks of people to the Serbian side of the fence were codified in Hungarian 
legislation, first for those caught within eight kilometers of the fence, and by 
2017, from anywhere in the country. At the same time, the Hungarian govern-
ment began to erect a second line of fencing on the southern border, along with 
military complexes and a specialized “transit zone” detention for migrants. In 
Greece, where tens of thousands of migrants remained stranded in EU-ran “hot 
spots” (Kalir and Rozakou, 2016), and also in Serbia emerged nodal points where 
marooned migrants formed an easily divisible multiplicity, held together only by 
the border policy that had pushed them to this zone (Tazzioli, 2016).
The Evolution of the Hungarian Solution to Migration
The designation “Hungarian solution to migration” only appeared in winter 
2015-2016, when the conservative-nationalist Fidesz government repeatedly 
referred to the relative success of the “Hungarian solution” in relation to EU 
138
Annastiina Kallius 
policy.9 The crafting of this solution had begun already with legislative changes 
in 2013, when arbitrary detention was re-introduced in response to rising 
numbers of asylum applications. The 2013 legislation also included contradictory 
measures that were, at the time, cautiously welcomed by civil society organiza-
tions. These included an “integration contract”, by which recognized refugees 
received some support to afford housing, but was conditional to punitive 
reporting measures. All Hungarian language education for recognized refugees 
was abolished.10
Migration was consolidated as a principal media agenda item after the Charlie 
Hebdo shootings in France in January 2015, when Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
held a speech connecting terrorism with migration. This period coincided with 
Serbian visa liberalization for Kosovars, which contributed to a large number of 
Kosovars crossing through Hungary in the first few months of 2015 in order to 
seek asylum in Germany. In April 2015, the government announced the launch 
of a pseudo-democratic “national consultation on terrorism and migration,” 
an essentially biased questionnaire sent to every Hungarian home.11 Together 
with a massive government-commissioned billboard campaign, the national 
consultation constituted the first large-scale propaganda campaign against 
immigration.12 Increasing numbers of migrants tested the reception infrastruc-
ture of Hungarian authorities, and in June 2015, the government announced the 
temporary unilateral suspension of the Dublin regulation, only to take back its 
words the following day. As migrants began to be stranded in train stations of 
Budapest, looking for ways to continue onwards to the West, the government 
announced its plan to build a fence on the southern border of Hungary. The 
announcement caused domestic and international outcry, and a large anti-fence 
protest was held in Budapest in July 2015.
At the same time, Hungarian asylum legislation underwent multiple changes 
that Nagy (2016a) has exhaustively analyzed. Serbia was declared a safe third 
country of transit, and thereby all asylum applications from people who had 
crossed through Serbia would face blanket rejection. Time to appeal against 
negative decisions were reduced, detention in “transit zones” at the southern 
border were introduced, and crossing the border fence was made a criminal 
9 See, for instance, abouthungary.hu, 19 February 2016, “Summit on Migration: 'The 
EU Approved the Hungarian Solution' at http://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/
Prime_Minister_Viktor_Orb%C3%A1n_s_press%20statement_following_the_EU_Summit/ 
(accessed 06/06/2017), and the official government news site kormany.hu, 24 February 




10 This section on the evolution of Hungarian asylum policy since 2012 is informed by 
my involvement as an activist at Migszol Csoport (Migrant Solidarity Group). Between 
2013 and 2016, I visited refugee camps, followed all legal and policy-developments, and 
the Hungarian media. I was also present at the Keleti station in summer 2015 conducting 
research on the conditions, and joined the March of Hope on 4 September 2015. For 
details, see Migszol (2016).
11 For the complete consultation in English, see kormany.hu/en, 24 April 2015, “National 
consultation on immigration to begin”, available at http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-
minister-s-office/news/national-consultation-on-immigration-to-begin (accessed 
13/06/2017).
12 For an analysis on the satirical counter-campaign staged by civil society, see Nagy, 2016b.
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offence punishable by three-five years in prison. New tent camps with poor 
conditions and limited legal aid were springing up in the country, while existing, 
well-functioning camps with solid infrastructure, experienced staff and case 
officers were closed. For reasons that were not made public, the govern-
ment refused an emergency relocation scheme proposed by the European 
Commission that would have seen migrants in Hungary being relocated to other 
EU member states in the framework of a quota resettlement scheme.
When the Hungarian government nominally pretended to follow the Dublin 
regulation by not allowing migrants simply travel through its territory, the train 
stations in Budapest turned into ad hoc refugee camps housing thousands of 
people with minimal help from the government or the municipality, relying 
instead on massive humanitarian operations set up by Hungarian volunteers 
(Simonovits and Bernát, 2016). After the vigil that marked the people who suffo-
cated to death in the ill-fated lorry, the stalemate in Keleti escalated to series of 
protests, culminating in a “March of Hope” of hundreds of people, who began to 
walk from Budapest to Vienna on September 4th. After the exhausted marchers 
collapsed on a highway (Kallius, 2016), the government responded by sending 
buses to transport the people to Vienna, in a clear breach of EU asylum legisla-
tion. When the government-organized transportation of people to the Austrian 
border continued for months, Budapest became empty of migrants (Kallius et 
al., 2016). After the border fence was completed in September, riots took place 
on the southern border crossing at Röszke, and some of those involved were 
later staged in a political trial for supposed terrorism and violently crossing the 
border (Amnesty International, 2016).
In summer 2016, all integration support for recognized refugees was 
abolished, and a mandatory three-year review of the refugee status was intro-
duced. Violent pushbacks of people to the Serbian side of the fence became 
normalized from July 2016, when legislative changes allowed the Hungarian 
authorities to “escort” back anyone found on the Hungarian side of the fence. The 
following quote represents a standard testimony on violence at the Hungarian-
Serbian border at the time:
“I entered the border…We were about fifteen of us, including women and children…
Ten minutes later about twenty army soldiers surrounded us and beat us. They put plastic 
handcuffs on me and threw me down on the ground and kicked me in the stomach, 
shoulder and head… They had four dogs without muzzles. One dog jumped on me but I 
managed to escape it. As I was lying on the ground, the soldiers used their batons to hit 
us on our legs and our heads. They didn’t say anything and we didn’t dare to say anything. 
After that, they brought us back to the fence, took our cuffs off and started pushing us 
through the fence and kicking us as we tried to crawl through the layers of razor-wire.” 
(Zaid, nineteen, Afghanistan, quoted in Human Rights Watch, 2016)
Similar testimonies were collected in 2016 and 2017 by multiple civil society 
organizations in both Serbia and Hungary. The Hungarian government denied 
the allegations, citing also the presence of border guards from other EU member 
states as guaranteeing that no violations occur. From late summer 2016 onwards, 
with a widely publicized campaign, border control was strengthened by new 
units of police-run “border hunters,” generally recruits from poor rural areas 
who are promised a stable income and a career. At the same time, the fence on 
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the southern border and the accompanying military complex became pervasive 
elements in public communications of the government, with for instance the 
Prime Minister’s and the government’s own Facebook pages regularly updated 
with videos and photo albums depicting the southern frontier. In addition, a 
series of large-scale propaganda campaigns against supposedly liberal western 
asylum policy directed by EU or by “Brussels,” took place in preparation for the 
referendum on EU-orchestrated resettlement of refugees in October 2016. At the 
same time, László Toroczkai, the self-proclaimed leader of border militias around 
the village of Ásotthalom, routinely posted pictures in social media of migrants 
apprehended and tied up around the border area.
Meanwhile, the “transit zones” on the Serbian side of the fence, where one 
is supposed to officially enter the country and ask for asylum, developed into 
militarized no-go zones extremely difficult to access by independent civil and 
watchdog organizations. By spring 2017, only ten people per day were allowed 
to ask for asylum in Hungary, and were consequently detained at the transit 
zone where access to independent legal aid was very difficult. With the effective 
sealing of the border and the fence-complex standing as an embodiment of 
legal instruments, the route shifted again in spring 2017. Later in the year several 
pushbacks on the Hungarian-Romanian border were reported, well as numerous 
accounts of violence on the Bulgarian-Serbian and Croatian-Serbian borders.
The Anatomy of the Hungarian Solution
As mentioned, the term “Hungarian solution” began appearing in winter 
2016, in government parlance unaware or willfully ignorant about the conno-
tations that the wording bears to the Holocaust. The explicit purpose of the 
solution is to emphasize a Huntingtonian clash of civilizations, and advance a 
rhetoric of protecting Christianity and Europe from two fronts: migrants from the 
South, and from liberal multiculturalism from the West. By extension, then, the 
solution advances a particular discourse of Europe, to which I will return later. It 
is essentially a policy package that can be divided into three elements.
Selective Closure of the Borders
Particularly the Southern and Eastern borders are selectively closed towards 
migrants. The government does not, however, engage in any large-scale efforts 
to obstruct migrants from moving onwards particularly to Austria. This selective 
closure is achieved chiefly through legislative measures (safe third country 
rule, state of emergency, pushback legislation, fence-related law, law on the 
fence), which are embodied in the military border zone complex. Government-
influenced national media continuously present the country’s borders as under 
pressure, or under attack, justifying further militarization. This selective closure 
pushes migrants to Serbia, and is unique in the extent, but not in form, as it 
represents an extreme version of EU-wide tendency of externalization of border 
management towards the South and East (Kallius, 2016; Casas-Cortes et al., 




These discourage migrants from moving to, or through, Hungary. Examples 
of deterrents include violence at the border zone, widespread, systematic 
detention in the transit zone on arbitrary grounds, poor quality of the refugee 
status determination process, poor reception conditions (e.g. those staying at 
refugee camps are not entitled to free food), and finally, the total abolishment 
of all integration support and language education, effectively rendering people 
granted international protection homeless.
Propaganda Campaigns
These already introduced campaigns include an omnipresent media presence 
of governmental discourse and slogans on billboards, TV advertisements, 
leaflets, posters, and print media, with slogans such as “Did you know that the 
Paris massacre was committed by migrants?”, “Did you know that since the 
beginning of the migration crisis, more than 300 people in Europe have died 
of terror attacks?”, “Brussels wants to resettle a townful of illegal immigrants 
in Hungary,” etc. The campaigns extend also to government-influenced discus-
sion programs on the television and radio, specially set up websites that, for 
instance, define the whole of Paris and Stockholm as no-go zones, opinion 
pieces in daily and weekly newspapers, and finally pseudo-democratic measures 
such as “national consultations” and the aforementioned referendum on 
migration. According to the government, the purpose of these campaigns, that 
are explicitly hostile towards the European Union and weave together impres-
sive conspiracy theories about western liberalism, NGOs, activists, and espe-
cially, the Hungarian-born American philanthropist George Soros, is in order to 
educate the Hungarian population regarding the dangers of immigration.
Overall, tightening of asylum legislation is by no means unique to Hungary. 
Across the European Union, member states responded to the events of 2015 
by introducing selective border closures or deterrents such as border checks 
on internal Schengen borders, tightening or nearly eliminating the possibility 
for family reunification for refugees, stricter Country of Origin-reports, and 
the EU-Turkey deal outlining that all migrants coming to Greece risk detention 
and possible deportation back to Turkey. Indeed, in the context of the EU and 
the European Economic Area, examples of similar measures predate the 
summer of migration in 2015. For instance, Norway’s classification of Russia 
as a safe third country parallels Hungary’s reliance on a similar denomination 
for Serbia in order to close the border. Regarding integration, Bulgaria also 
gives minimal integration support to people granted international protection, 
as does, for instance, Finland. The difference lies in the existence of relatively 
well-functioning welfare systems of Western Europe, available also for people 
granted international protection. In the context of Hungary, apart from reducing 
the number of arriving migrants to a trickle, the effect of the Hungarian solution 
to migration is that it attempts to push migrants in Hungary to the fringes of 
the society along with other marginalized populations (Rajaram, 2015). It is this 
domestic context to witch I now turn.
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Domestic Anchoring of the Hungarian Solution
Outwards, the Hungarian solution to migration unfolds in relation to different 
divides and hierarchies of European space. Domestically, it is connected to 
other policies that produce, exclude and police marginalized populations, as an 
expression of the Fidesz governement’s discourse of hegemonic citizenship that 
continues the historically present punitive governance of the poor (Udvarhelyi, 
2015). As Nagy (2016a) notes, ever since obtaining power in 2010, the Fidesz 
government has secured its popularity by turning the public’s attention away 
from real crises of economy, housing, education and healthcare by a process of 
first creating enemies, and then “defeating” these enemies. These enemies have 
included foreign banks, large foreign retail outlets, and more implicitly sexual 
minorities, and the Roma population (Fekete, 2016). At the time of writing, the 
Hungarian born American financier and philanthropist George Soros and human 
rights NGOs fulfill this role. Indeed, the drafting of the Hungarian solution cannot 
be considered in isolation to the exacerbated stigmatization of other marginal 
groups in society, of which concrete measures have included the criminalization 
of homelessness in the Hungarian Constitution (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 
2013; Udvarhelyi, 2014), and legalizing school segregation for children of Roma 
origin (European Roma Rights Centre, 2016). These measures have also included 
the transformation from a welfare society to a workfare society, which, according 
to Szőke (2015), upholds and reproduces economic and social inequalities and 
creates structures of dependency at the municipal level, and obscures official 
statistics on unemployment levels.
The Fidesz government has on numerous occasions made explicit connec-
tions between unwanted populations, most notably the Roma and refugees. In 
September 2015, the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán explicitly stated that Hungary 
should not resettle any refugees from Greece and Italy, because of the “burden” 
of being home to hundreds of thousands of Roma. Furthermore, Hungary 
never asked Europe “to take care of its gypsies,” and consequently it is unfair 
of Europe to ask Hungary to take care of refugees (Jámbor, 2015). Rajaram 
(2015) has commented in detail on this slippage between unwanted groups of 
people, connecting the production of unwanted populations to capitalism as an 
economic system that regularly produces surplus populations. He argues that 
the marginalized situation of irregular migrants today cannot be understood 
without a wider historicization of production of locally marginalized populations. 
Similarly, Anderson (2013) has pointed to the similarities between “non-citizens” 
and “failed citizens”, and connected the exclusion of marginalized populations 
to economy and the dominant values of the majority community. Indeed, 
considering the values of whiteness, Christianity, and heterosexuality that the 
Fidesz-sanctioned campaigns publicly advocate, the slippages between different 
unwanted populations become apparent, as Cervinkova (2016) has also shown 
in the context of Poland. The Hungarian solution to migration is, then, a question 




Overlapping Hierarchies of European Space
This campaign of a particular form of conservative citizenship exceeds the 
national boundary by advocating a particular idea of Europe and the location 
of Hungary therein. This domestic discourse is crucial when considering the 
east-west constellations of refugee crisis that Zsuzsa Gille (2011 and 2017), 
Dzenovska (2016 and 2017), and Tošić (2017) have uncovered. In government 
communications, Hungary emerges as the rescuer of Europe. This positioning, 
which is at the crux of my argument, is the key legitimating factor of the 
Hungarian solution to migration. The following random sample of news items 
from summer 2016 on the government’s official English language news portal 
illustrates this argument:13
- Hungary standing in the way of immigration (May 19)
- Brussels should not decide who we want to live alongside (May 24)
- Co-existence of civilisations is a major question for the future (June 1)
- Infringement procedure is Brussels’ revenge against Hungary for not spending 
funds on integration of migrants (May 30)
- European leaders have placed themselves in opposition to their peoples (June 3)
- Mission of every Hungarian is to serve survival of nation (June 6)
- Migrants are becoming increasingly violent (June 7)
- Arrival of masses in Europe will trigger an unmanageable situation (June 14)
- EU migration policy requires a fundamental ideological change (June 20)
- We must discard Brussels’ immigration policy, which is endangering the unity 
of Europe (June 27)
- Hungary represents order in a Europe of increasing disorder (June 27)
- Brussels must be stopped (July 6, August 1)
- Government of Hungary: EU is not able to handle the migration issue (June 29)
- Hungarian-Serbian border under constant pressure (July 20)
- The political Left would like to invite migrants; the Government would like to 
restore security (July 25)
- The European way of life must be protected (July 25)
- Europe is in its twenty-fourth hour (July 26)
- Millions of migrants awaiting entry into Europe (July 27)
As becomes apparent, a basic component of this governmental discourse is 
the juxtaposition of “Europe” with “EU”. In short, the latter refers to undemo-
cratic “Brussels bureaucrats” who promote multiculturalism and have lost touch 
with real “people”, which will inevitably lead to clashes between Muslims and 
European Christians. Europe, on the other hand, refers to a particular under-
standing of the continent as white, Christian and heterosexual, a constellation 
of sovereign democratic peoples to whom, unlike “Brussels”, the Fidesz govern-
ment listens to. In such a rhetorical move, populations that do not adhere to 
this norm of citizenship remain excluded from “Europe,” and the figure of the 
migrant emerges as the key representative of alterity (Böröcz and Sarkar, 2017; 
Cantat, 2016). In short, the government represents Hungary as the frontier of 
Europe, which is under attack from two directions: from the west by “Brussels”, 
and from the Balkans in the south by a faceless mass of violent migrants. I now 
13 These are the original wordings, in English, of the items. More similar news items 
available in English at www.kormany.hu/en, many of them pointing to the “historical 
responsibility” of Hungary to “protect Europe”.
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turn to this strategic positioning of the frontier in detail, analyzing how it relates 
to a tactical positioning of two overlapping divides of European space: the east/
west divide, on one hand, and Europe/Balkans, on the other.
Legitimization of the Hungarian solution to migration revolves around tactical 
deployment of a colonially gradated conception of European space. Crucially, 
governmental propaganda campaigns’ positioning of Hungary as the frontier 
of Europe, excludes the ambiguous Balkans from European space, highlighting 
the ever-present dynamic of nesting orientalisms, whereby the eastward and 
southward neighbors are considered just slightly more oriental (Bakić-Hayden, 
1995; Helms, 2008). In the context of the EU in the 2010s, such a “great chain 
of orientalism” (Khazzoom, 2003) also appears in relation to references to the 
inherently more racist character of Eastern Europe. As Krastev (2017) points out, 
at play is a connection, albeit not causal, and a reappearance of the east/west 
divide. Social scientists working on Eastern Europe have pointed out that the 
so-called refugee crisis has led to the resurfacing of the question of exactly how 
“European” certain Eastern European countries are (Dzenovska, 2016 and 2017; 
Gille, 2016 and 2017). As Dzenovska writes with reference to Latvia: “Eastern 
Europe emerged as an ideal type, an unsympathetic not-quite-European subject 
mired in racialized paranoia about foreigners, exaggerated concerns about 
self-determination and self-preservation, and timeworn claims of historical 
suffering” (2016: 12). Thus Dzenovska exposes the coloniality of the underpin-
nings of the east-west moral divide. Her work follows a vibrant debate on the 
colonial character of postsocialist denominations, which pointed to the orien-
talist production of the “east” and also criticized the marginalization of Eastern 
European scholars in postsocialist debates (Buchowski, 2006; Cervinkova, 2012; 
Kürti and Skalník, 2011; Owczarzak, 2009, Chari and Verdery, 2009; Wolff, 1994). 
Notably, Hungarian scholars have also revealed an economic constellation 
of Europe where Eastern Europe holds a semi-peripheral position, resulting 
in relations of labor and capital that are inadvertently linked to questions of 
race (Böröcz and Sarkar 2017; Böröcz 2000; Gagyi, 2016; Melegh, 2016). These 
relations of power and values have also been reproduced and internalized by 
actors in Hungarian society, as Böröcz (2006) succinctly reveals in his analysis 
of Hungarian liberal intellectuals’ conception of goodness as a virtue located, 
and stemming from, Western European space. In this light, the orientalist tones 
with which international, mostly western, media discovered the moral deficits of 
Eastern European countries and Balkan route in 2015, seem hardly surprising.
The resistance to common asylum policies that the governments of Eastern 
European countries, especially the Visegrád Four (V4) countries of Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Poland and Hungary,14 is often expressed in similarly colonial terms. 
International media often compares Eastern European countries to Western 
Europe, as suffering from backwardness, and seemingly genetic resistance 
14 See Buchowski (2006: 465) on the particular positioning of the Visegrád countries in 
relation to nesting orientalisms.
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to “European” values of liberalism and equality.15 This negative international 
media coverage with its allusions to Hungary’s “failure” to catch up with Western 
Europe has caused public exasperation in Hungary: I have witnessed many a 
conversation where people have wondered at the outrage towards Hungarian 
asylum policy, when the European public hardly even noticed the construction 
of earlier, and arguably deadlier, fences on other EU external borders in Spain 
or Greece. In addition, why were Eastern European countries judged by their 
sinister governments, and Western European countries by their good people? A 
commentary by Ungár (2016), a member of a small, but visible green Hungarian 
opposition party Lehet Más a Politika (“Politics Can Be Different,” LMP) coins 
these frustrations:
“Unsurprisingly, many Western observers are content to see this referendum [on EU 
refugee resettlement quotas] as yet more proof of prime minister Viktor Orbán’s xeno-
phobia, and the Hungarian people’s inability to be civilised members of the ‘European 
family’. It’s an easy position to take, but it’s underwritten by arguably the last acceptable 
form of racism among the liberal-left: the denigration of Eastern Europeans. Indeed, it 
is this all-too-palpable anti-eastern sentiment on the part of the EU’s leaders that drives 
many Hungarians to support Orbán… 
And what did the EU do? It held numerous summits and urged Eastern Europeans to treat 
migrants humanely. It was a shockingly counterproductive move… And it is precisely this 
high-handed dismissal of ordinary Hungarians’ fears and concerns that drives many to 
look to the far right for answers. The Hungarian government’s fence, built on the border 
with Serbia, may be an objectionable answer to these fears, but it was still an answer.” 
(Ungár, 2016)
Ungár’s short commentary is haunted by disappointment and bitterness 
towards the representation of Eastern Europe, and Hungary in particular, as 
backward and uncivilized. What follows is a conceptual leap from exposing the 
EU’s double-standard’s to legitimizing the border-fence. He also points to the 
larger context of the events of 2015 that is often ignored in the international 
media, that the east-west divide is something that legitimizes the fence as an 
“answer”, illustrating a process by which the resentment of an opposition politi-
cian is translated into a defense of the Hungarian governmental asylum policy. I 
suggest that Ungár’s commentary illustrates one of the key features behind the 
implementation of the Hungarian solution, and the relational analysis called for 
by Gille, namely the government’s strategic position at the crux of overlapping 
moral hierarchies in between two of Hungary’s constitutive outsides – Western 
15 “Eastern Bloc’s Resistance to Refugees Highlights Europe’s Cultural and Political 
Divisions,” ran a title in the New York Times in mid-September (Lyman, 2015). The article 
reads: “Their [Eastern European countries’] stance – reflecting a mix of powerful far-right 
movements, nationalism, racial and religious prejudices as well as economic arguments 
that they are less able to afford to take in outsiders than their wealthier neighbors – is 
the latest evidence of the stubborn cultural and political divides that persist between East 
and West… When joining the European Union – as the former Communist countries have 
done since 2004 – nations are asked to pledge support to a raft of so-called European 
values, including open markets, transparent government, respect for an independent 
media, open borders, cultural diversity, protection of minorities and a rejection of xeno-
phobia. But the reality is that the former Communist states have proved sluggish in 
actually absorbing many of these values and practicing them. Oligarchs, cronyism and 
endemic corruption remain a part of daily life in many of the countries, freedom of the 




European member states dubbed as the EU, on the one hand, and the Balkans, 
on the other.
In other words, the symbolic position of Hungary as Eastern European, 
but not part of the Balkans, in this chain of orientalism is capitalized on by the 
Hungarian government. As the opposition politician quoted above alludes, the 
occupation of this imagined niche is crucial in order to understand the legitimi-
zation and the implementation of the Hungarian solution for migration. In what 
follows, through his statement I focus on the ways in which this gradation is 
central for the vindication of the Hungarian solution, and how it allows the Fidesz 
government to override the importance of the imagined east-west frontier with 
the imagined east-south axis.
The orientalization of the Balkans trickles down from the government rhetoric 
to the daily language of people, exemplified poignantly with the Hungarian 
verb lebalkánozni – to “Balkan down” someone or something. It taps into the 
historical consciousness of Hungary as the northernmost bastion of the Ottoman 
Empire, and wider Balkanist discourse that relies on a conceptual divide between 
“Europe” and the Balkans. A rich body of research has shown the different 
manifestations of ambivalence towards the Balkans as marginal, but central, to 
notions of European space (Herzfeld, 1989; Todorova, 1997; Helms, 2008; Green, 
2005). Balibar (2003) has also posed central questions about the constant nego-
tiation of the Balkans in relation to European space. How is it that the Balkans 
are considered an external space subject to intervention (such as by NATO), but 
yet internal, as undoubtedly geographically located on European soil?
Accordingly, governmental discourse that places Hungary at the frontiers 
of Europe omits the Balkan Peninsula from the European space. This discourse 
traces its way from government-sanctioned TV advertisements to daily 
exchanges between people, and are aptly illustrated by the following short 
discussion I witnessed at a meeting of humanitarian volunteers in Budapest 
in December 2015. During this planning meeting of integration-related support 
programs for recognized refugees, planning to settle in Hungary, a volunteer 
posed the following question: “But why should we integrate the refugees in 
Hungary, if they want to leave towards to Germany and the West in any case?” 
The self-appointed leader of the group was convincing in her answer: “That is a 
very valid question. Let’s remember, though, that Hungary is the first European 
country that refugees arrive at – and if we integrate them here, we do a favor for 
the whole of Europe, as they will already know how things work.” The programs 
included integration-related measures such as help in searching for housing and 
employment, but also cultural programs such as sightseeing in Budapest, and 
visiting the zoo.
There are several features in this small exchange that warrant attention: 
how smoothly the volunteer reproduced the division between the “west” as 
desirable, and by corollary, the “east” as undesirable; how straightforwardly 
Hungary was portrayed as a transit country, and finally, how comfortably the 
leader countered this not by negating the east/west divide, but by emphasizing 
the superior importance of the divide between “Europe” and the Balkans. This 
rhetorical move located Hungary in the same conceptual space as Germany, and 
questioned the conflation of Europe with the European Union by locating Greece 
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outside of Europe, but relying also on the east/west divide. In the same vein, 
the governmental discourse and propaganda also emphasizes the emergence 
of “Eastern” leadership for Europe (as opposed to Western, undemocratic and 
technocratic rule). The volunteers’ exchange further pinpoints the stubborn 
east-west divide of European space that unproblematically presents Hungary as 
an “Eastern” transit space (Tošić, 2017).
Considering the presence of these persistent divisions of European space – 
Europe/Balkans, and east/west – what emerges is the particular, strategic posi-
tioning of Hungary at their crux. Europe-wide relations, in other words, allow 
the Hungarian government to occupy a strategic position: a leader of the truly 
European “community”  – proudly eastern, and definitely European, against 
those in the east and south.
Conclusion: The East-South Axis
In spring 2017 the European Parliament voted on the process of triggering 
the article 7 against Hungary. If passed, this could mean sanctions for Hungary’s 
voting rights in the EU due to lack of adherence to EU values.16 The reasons 
cited behind this action was a law branding foreign-funded NGOs as “foreign 
agents”, a move to outlaw the private Hungarian-American university, Central 
European University, and finally, the country’s migration policy. In this article 
I have focused on the third element, unraveling the evolution, content, and 
relational context of the Hungarian solution to migration. To clarify, I have not 
argued that the Hungarian solution is an outcome of Western, liberal discourse 
that judges Eastern Europe as almost, but not quite, European. Rather, I have 
claimed that this discourse, along the east/west and Europe/Balkans divides are 
key elements that the Hungarian government has successfully used in order to 
legitimize its migration policy. Current discourse in the international media that 
presents the Visegrád countries as an almost-European, semi-peripheral and 
uncivilized location, reduces the entire region with its multiple histories and 
the actual dynamics of “surplus” populations merely into a simplified socialist 
past, while at the same time conflates Europe not only with EU, but with only 
Western Europe. In this imagination, “real” European values are neatly listed as 
a liberal handbook: multiculturalism, minimal governments, and free markets. 
In order to truly understand and appreciate the emergence and consolidation 
of the Hungarian solution to migration, it needs to be approached through 
the domestic context as well as from the two imagined, constitutive outsides, 
Western Europe and the Balkans. What emerges is a strategic employment of 
these two moral hierarchies, and a positioning on what I term the East-South 
axis, that legitimizes the Hungarian solution.
16 Press release, European Parliament, 17 May 2017, “Fundamental rights in Hungary: 





In July 2016, the European Commission proposed a new legislative framework 
for common European asylum policy.17 Many of the elements in this new policy, 
such as regular review of asylum statuses, detention as a means of deterrence 
and most crucially, the adoption of a legal fence by considering Turkey and 
Serbia as safe third countries, reflect the policies included in the Hungarian 
solution. As Tošić (2017), and indeed also the Hungarian government, note, the 
initial juxtaposition of Germany’s “tolerant” migration policy with Hungary’s 
restrictive one has given way to increasing understanding of the Hungarian 
solution to migration (Tošić, 2017: 152). In order to understand the turbulent 
landscape of European migration policy and the place of Hungary therein, the 
analysis of individual countries’ policies necessarily needs to be located in the 
wider context, where migration policy becomes also a manifestation of different 
understandings and imaginations of Europe as both a symbolic and material 
location.
As Dzenovska (2016) argues, crises provide an opportunity to reassert 
and redefine Europeanness. Just as the Europeanness of Greece was ques-
tioned during the financial crisis, since the summer of migration in 2015 the 
Europeanness of numerous Eastern European countries came into question with 
their perceived deficiency of compassion towards refugees. While advancing a 
particular idea of Europe, the Hungarian government has used this underlying 
quest for Europeanness to its advantage in positioning itself as the frontier. 
What emerges, then, is not one divide, but rather an assemblage of centre-
periphery divides on which the rhetoric of the Hungarian government relies. The 
construction of Balkans as a violent, external space within Europe allowed for 
the Hungarian government to posit itself as the defender of Europe: the country’s 
position in the supposed “front lines” signals the Fidesz government’s attempt 
to provincialize Western Europe and catapult Hungary from the waiting room of 
its postsocialist history (Chakrabarty, 2007) to the front rows of European policy-
making as a proudly Eastern European leader.
17 Press release, European Commission, 13 July 2016, “Completing the reform of the 
Common European Asylum System: towards an efficient, fair and humane asylum 
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The East-South Axis: Legitimizing 
the “Hungarian Solution to Migration”
The Hungarian solution to migration is a policy package consisting of three 
elements: selective closure of borders, series of deterrents, and governmental 
xenophobic discourse and propaganda campaigns. This policy package is legiti-
mized by the Hungarian government’s strategic self-positioning as the “frontier 
of Europe.” This position is enabled by interwoven moral divides of the European 
space: the east/west and the Europe/Balkans. At the same time, the Hungarian 
solution is anchored to a series of domestic political manoeuvres that advance a 
hegemonic discourse of citizenship and attempt to exclude domestic, margina-
lized populations from the public sphere. In order to understand the Hungarian 
government’s punitive approach to migration, its policy needs to be examined in 
the domestic context, on the one hand, and in relation to those European moral 
hierarchies that are used to legitimize these policies, on the other. This article is 
a contribution to discussion on the dynamics of European peripheries in relation 
to migration and location.
L’axe Est-Sud : légitimer 
la « solution hongroise à la migration »
La solution hongroise à la migration est un ensemble de politiques comprenant 
trois éléments  : la fermeture sélective des frontières, une série de moyens de 
dissuasion et un discours gouvernemental xénophobe aux côtés de campagnes 
de propagande. Cet ensemble de politiques est légitimé par le gouvernement 
ayant stratégiquement proclamé la Hongrie comme « la frontière de l’Europe ». 
Cette position est rendue possible par les divisions morales qui s’enchevêtrent 
dans l’espace européen : divisions est/ouest et Europe/Balkans. Dans le même 
temps, la solution hongroise repose sur plusieurs stratagèmes de politiques 
publiques internes promouvant un discours hégémonique de citoyenneté tout 
en favorisant l’exclusion de la sphère publique des populations nationales 
marginalisées. Afin de comprendre l’approche punitive du gouvernement 
hongrois à l’égard de la migration, sa politique doit être examinée d’une part, 
dans son contexte national et d’autre part, à la lumière des hiérarchies morales 
européennes utilisées pour légitimer ces politiques. Cet article entend contribuer 
à la discussion sur la dynamique des périphéries européennes en relation avec 
la migration et les territoires.
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El eje Este-Sur: legitimación 
de la «solución húngara a la migración»
La solución húngara a la migración es un paquete de políticas que consta de tres 
elementos: el cierre selectivo de las fronteras, una serie de medidas disuasorias 
y el discurso gubernamental xenófobo y las campañas de propaganda. Este 
paquete de políticas está legitimado por el autoposicionamiento estratégico del 
gobierno húngaro como la «frontera de Europa». Esta posición está habilitada 
por divisiones morales entrelazadas del espacio europeo: la división este/oeste y 
Europa/Balcanes. Al mismo tiempo, la solución húngara se basa en una serie de 
maniobras políticas internas del gobierno que promueven el discurso hegemó-
nico de la ciudadanía e intentan excluir a las poblaciones domésticas margi-
nadas de la esfera pública. Para entender el enfoque punitivo de la migración 
del gobierno húngaro, su política debe ser examinada en el contexto nacional, 
por un lado, y las jerarquías morales europeas que se utilizan para legitimar 
estas políticas, por el otro. Este artículo es una contribución al debate sobre la 
dinámica de las periferias europeas en relación con la migración y la ubicación.
